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How Class Action Fees Work in the
Eleventh Circuit
Jeffrey G. Casurella*
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigating the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in a Federal Rule 23
class action is no picnic. Usually, payment of legal fees is set from a
contractual arrangement between attorney and client. That is often
quick and easy. Conversely, payment of class action legal fees is set by a
district court. That process can be drawn out and labor intensive. In
this latter situation, a district court must be persuaded, ultimately, that
the amount of the award is reasonable.1 But what does “reasonable”
mean? It is a tricky question—class action math always is—and
litigating it can become contact sport.
The parties must be ready for potential opposition, objectors, and a
skeptical court as attorney’s fees are a part of the entire settlement
package. And then there is the perception problem: in an age when a
melting pot of television talking heads, newspapers, and social media
cast more and more influence on the national dialogue—in this case,
this influence is anything anti-lawyer—will a court shut out such
platitudes and greenlight paying lawyers gazillions of dollars? Even the
late-night comedians have joined the fray, often ridiculing lawyers in
their monologues. But such a mentality is not anything new. In David

*
University of Georgia (B.A., 1981); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1984). Mercer
Law Review, Member (1983–84). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Mr. Casurella has
focused over the last 30 years of his practice to prosecuting class action litigation
throughout the United States.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) authorizes such an award: “In a certified class action, the
court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by
law or by the parties’ agreement.” See also Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478
(1980) (establishing reasonableness standard). In addition to seeking an award for fees,
class counsel often seeks an award for nontaxable costs as provided by the rule. A
discussion seeking such costs is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Copperfield,2 Dickens described a lawyer named Uriah Heep as one
whose “lank forefinger followed up every line as he read and made
clammy tracks along the page . . . like a snail.”3 All of this negativism,
even entrenched historical negativism, is a lot to overcome.
Significant time and money are usually spent by the lawyers to land
ongoing class action case. But it is often a bumpy landing. Preparing a
fee application, on top of all of the other filings that accompany it—
settlement papers that include motions, briefs, declarations or
affidavits, evidentiary documents, studies, notices, and the like—must
be carefully choreographed. And nevermind the fact that “professional”
objector attorneys can be awaiting offshore, often perceived by the
litigation counsel as circling sharks hunting for their next meal. These
waters can be difficult to navigate.4
Mindful of this, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a fee fight
should not turn into a “second major litigation.”5 That caution, however,
is more aspirational than it is reality. In the bob and weave of a big
money brawl, the amount of attorney’s fees sought can often be much
larger than the amount of relief collectively obtained by individual class
members.6 Attorneys, like everyone else, can and will fight hard when
the fight comes down to their fees. It has always been this way, and a
fight over attorney’s fees can last for years.7 But all of this is not
2. Charles
Dickens, David
Copperfield,
PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/766/766-h/766-h.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2016). Uriah
Heep is not to be confused with the rock band of the 1970s.
3. Dickens, supra note 2, at 136.
4. A 2015 report by the Federal Judicial Center, for example, indicated that “the
burden or complexity of fee awards” in fee-shifting cases had not been significantly
reduced despite warnings over at least the past three previous decades that fee disputes
were consuming “substantial judicial resources.” See ALAN HIRSCH ET AL., AWARDING
ATTORNEYS FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 2 (Kris Markarian, 3rd ed. 2015).
5. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“A request for attorney’s fees
should not result in a second major litigation.”).
6. For example, a national study conducted of 432 “no-injury” class action
settlements and trial awards from the years 2005–2015 found that class counsel received
37.9% of available funds while class members received less than 9% of the total. That
averaged over four times the amount distributed to the class. Joanna Shepherd, An
Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions, Emory Univ. School of Law Rsch. Paper No.
16-402 (Feb. 4, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726905.
7. The speediest turnarounds—from filing a motion that seeks approval of fees to
actual payment—are roughly five to six months. This is with the court acting
expeditiously and absent any opposition, objections, or appeals. But with opposition,
objections, or appeals, a fee dispute can often last two years or more, and in the case of
the Home Depot customer data security breach case, over five years. In re Home Depot,
Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:14-MD-02583-TWT, 2017 U.S. LEXIS
221736 at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom.,
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difficult to imagine. The on-the-hook defendant is primarily concerned
with its entire monetary burden, mindful of not just the settlement
amount, but the enormous outlays of fees and expenses it also must pay
its own attorneys and experts. 8 Class counsel, too, is naturally
motivated to maximize their award as a piece of the settlement pie.9
There is a lot at stake.
Enter the district court. Once a settlement is achieved or a judgment
is taken, the district court has a “significant supervisory role” in the
settlement process.10 This was recently expanded and clarified by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to mean “a type
of a fiduciary role for the class” to ensure that the entire settlement is
“fair, adequate, and reasonable.”11 As part of the settlement, the district

In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2019), on remand, In re Home Depot, Inc.,
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:14-MD-02583-TWT, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 13978
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2020), appeal pending sub. nom.
8. In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d at 1080 (noting that “defendant is concerned, first
and foremost, with its total liability”).
9. These concerns have been noticed not just by district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit, but also nationwide.
In the class context, courts often comment that there is an ‘incentive of class
counsel, in complicity with the defendant’s counsel, to sell out the class by
agreeing with the defendant to recommend that the judge approve a settlement
involving a meager recovery for the class but generous compensation for the
lawyers.’
See Keim v. ADF MidAtlantic, LLC, 328 F.R.D. 668, 689 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting
Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir.
2011)). See also In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 446 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[W]e are sympathetic to [these] concerns . . .”); In re Samsung Top-Load Washing
Mach. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod Liab. Litig., 997 F.3d 1077, 1090 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e
have expressed wariness about the potential for class counsel and defendants to reach an
agreement that prioritizes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs at the expense of class
compensation and the interests of class members . . . .”).
10. Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1293 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the district court satisfied its supervisory function under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)
to ensure no collusion occurred among the parties’ settlement).
11. Shiyang Huang v. Equifax Inc. (In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.),
999 F.3d 1247, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021). Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
acknowledged such a fiduciary status, it has come close to doing so. See Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (finding that Rule 23 must be applied
with the interests of absent class members “in close view.”). Other Circuits have
previously subscribed to this notion of the district court assuming a fiduciary rule for Rule
23(e) purposes. See Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that the district court has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure the class members’ interests
were adequately represented); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“[D]istrict court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members . . .”);
Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district
court is a fiduciary of the class for Rule 23(e) purposes).
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court must be satisfied that the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded
is reasonable.12
So, is it legally proper for attorneys to make millions while an
individual class member may only receive a few dollars? And, do the
rules create a “divided loyalty” ethical problem when class counsel,
presumably self-interested, becomes a claimant to the common-fund
that necessarily reduces class members’ compensation? 13 These are
difficult ethical issues often considered in the approval of a settlement,
and more specifically, in an application for attorney’s fees.
All of this has not escaped the watchful eye of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner, who, in
a trio of widely cited opinions issued in 2014, lambasted the fee
harvesting process as “outlandish,” “questionable,” and “scandalous.”14
Such language seemingly gilds the popular perception that it is the
lawyers, not the victims, who make the lion-share of the money. But on
the other hand, fundamental fairness dictates that skilled legal counsel
should be incentivized to earn a reasonable fee, even a big fee, for
successfully representing a group of similarly-situated individuals who
suffer a harm, even a small harm.15 And there is the rub.
No matter whether the award being sought is from a common-fund or
from a statutory entitlement, all courts within the Eleventh Circuit
must determine that the amount of the fee is reasonable and likewise
be assured that it is not a product of unfair collusion between the

12. See Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 478 (“[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a commonfund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”). See also Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946
F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A]ttorneys’ fees awarded from a common-fund shall be
based on a reasonable percentage of the fund established for the benefit of the class.”).
13. The Committee note for FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C) provides this cautionary
statement:
Examination of the attorney-fee provisions may also be valuable in assessing
the fairness of the proposed settlement. Ultimately, any award of attorney’s
fees must be evaluated under Rule 23(h), and no rigid limits exist for such
awards. Nonetheless, the relief actually delivered to the class can be a
significant factor in determining the appropriate fee award.
14. Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2014) (“outlandish”); Redman
v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 2014) (settlement was “wrong”); Eubank
v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (entire settlement found “scandalous”).
15. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.REV.
2043, 2047 (2010) (concluding that attorneys should be fully incentivized through fee
awards “to bring as many cost-justified actions as possible”); Amchem Prods., Inc., 521
U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))
(“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights.”).
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parties.16 This Article will drill down what constitutes a “reasonable”
attorney fee. The discussion here will get into the practical elements of
making fee applications. Likewise, there is discussion about some of the
problems that may drag down a settlement, such as, “clear sailing
provisions” and “kicker clauses.” These dark holes are often the product
of varying negotiation strengths or weaknesses that can sometimes
jeopardize the timely final approval of a settlement package, especially
in large class action cases that can attract lots of objectors.
For context, this article begins with some history of how attorneys
charged fees in early America. Readers may be surprised to find that
the challenges regarding fees that faced lawyers 200 years ago are not
unlike the challenges that lawyers face today. Such a lookback is
helpful as it demonstrates exactly how attorneys charged their clients
from long ago, and thereafter traces the evolution of attorney’s fees and
how such fees were charged through the modern standards of
contingent fees and hourly rates used today. In a sense, it demonstrates
the evolving nature of what the word “reasonable” means as it modifies
the phrase “attorney’s fees.”
To keep things practical, the scope is limited to controlling authority
for federal cases situated in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. The
discussion here emphasizes fee applications that seek a percentage from
a pool of money, often called a common-fund fee award, that is created
out of a settlement. This is the type of fee award that is sought in most
class action cases.17 This contrasts with fee applications that seek a
statutory-fee award in which a defendant pays attorney’s fees, known
as a “lodestar,”18 directly to class counsel. The lodestar—a word that
does not naturally roll off the tongue in normal conversation—has been

16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’
agreement.” See In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1265
(observing that the district court must guard against collusive practices that favor class
representatives or their attorneys over absent class members).
17. For example, for all reported class action cases involving fees during the years
2009–2013, a national study carried out by Professors Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey
Miller, and Roy Germano determined that 53.61% were awarded fees on a percentage
basis as opposed to 6.29% were awarded based on a lodestar. A hybrid of cases mixing a
percentage amount cross-checked with a lodestar amount comprised 38.23% of the cases,
while 1.86% of the cases left it up to the district court’s discretion. T. Eisenberg et al.,
Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions: 2009-2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 942–47 (2017).
18. “Lodestar” has been defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as “something that
serves as a guiding star.” Lodestar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
https://www.unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/lodestar (last visited Sept. 21,
2021); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (“The ‘lodestar’ figure has, as
its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.”).

884

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

defined as “the number of hours worked multiplied by the prevailing
hourly rates” under a federal fee-shifting statute.19 The basic difference
between these two payment schemes is that the common-fund method
comes from a pot of money created for absent class members, while the
fee-shifting method comes from the opposing party.
The analysis here starts with two rules, the “English Rule” and the
“American Rule,” that are the center of the universe of this discussion.
Understanding these rules, and where they come from, underpins any
rationale that either justifies or criticizes an attorney fee award.
II. THE ENGLISH AND THE AMERICANS: TWO PEOPLES DIVIDED BY A
SIMPLE RULE OVER ATTORNEY’S FEES
A. Historical Development
Under the “English Rule,” as explained by the Supreme Court in
Hensley v. Eckerhart,20 “the losing party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
pays the winner’s fees.”21 In England, the Rule had its origins from
early statutes created by Parliament.22 The rule is simply triggered by
demonstrating the objective fact of a party’s complete defeat.23 It was
part of a larger and more elaborate payment costs system in which the
loser would have to pay the winner all legal costs, not just attorney’s
fees, but other expenses too.24 This would provide the winner full and
fair compensation.25 The sentiment during these early times was that a
victory was not totally complete without the inclusion of all out-ofpocket monies spent in prosecuting the prevailing party’s cause.26 This

19. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010).
20. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424.
21. Id. at 443 n. 2.
22. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993).
23. Vargo, supra note 22.
24. W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the
United States the “Odd Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
361, 404–06 n. 338 (1999). Such an award is therefore not dependent on bad faith, fault,
or frivolity. But there may be mitigating factors that could reduce the amount of the
award in “partial” victories. And, like anything in the law, there are “state of mind” and
other exceptions that may exempt a universal application of this Rule. Davis, supra at
note 24, at 405–06.
25. David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and
Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 583,
604 (2005).
26. Root, supra note 25, at 589 (“This is in line with the old Roman law that an
unjustified party should make whole his adversary. [Cit. omitted.] It also is in line with
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same sentiment today, popularly known as “loser-pays,” provides fuel to
tort reform agendas promoted by various conservative groups.27
Initially, the English Rule flourished in pre-Revolutionary War
America. At that time, and much like it is now, anti-lawyer sentiment
was intense and universal. Occasionally, there were calls to ban
lawyers entirely—that was always unsuccessful—but what often
followed was restrictive attorney fee regulations imposed by colonial
legislatures.28 Essentially, lawyers had to stick to a fee schedule based
on various tasks performed, such as “perusing” pleadings, making court
appearances, and arguing causes.29 This meant that lawyers could only
charge their clients what the legislatures said they could charge.30
Such fee restrictions were highly unpopular with lawyers and were
considered draconian. John Adams’ recorded diary entry for July 28,
1766, tells of a meeting of his local bar at a coffee house where one of
the speakers “rail’d about the lowness of the fees,” this being a “common
[p]lace Topick.”31 This situation incentivized grumbling lawyers to take
on higher volumes of work and to also search for creative ways around
these legislative curbs.32
the premise that a victory is not complete when the costs of obtaining the victory are not
covered.”) Id. at n. 243.
27. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L. J. 597, 628–29 (2010) (discussing tort reform loser-pays proposal
from Quayle Council on Competitiveness from the early 1990s).
28. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery,
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10–11 n. 8 (1984).
29. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 878 n. 101 (1929), which
reprinted N.Y. STAT. c. 10, § 4 (1829):
Retaining fee, three dollars and seventy-five cents, to one counsel only;
Perusing, amending, and signing every petition of appeal, and every answer to
a petition of appeal, two dollars and fifty cents; Perusing and amending every
other petition to the court, in a case where an appeal is pending, or in which a
writ of error shall have been brought, one dollar and twenty-five cents;
Perusing, amending and settling every special pleading, entry or order, one
dollar and fifty cents; Attending the court to make or oppose a motion, or to
present or oppose a petition, one dollar and twenty-five cents; Arguing every
special motion or petition, two dollars and fifty cents; Arguing every cause, or
attending for such argument pursuant to notice, three dollars and seventy-five
cents; But the foregoing fees shall be allowed only to one counsel on each side,
who shall have been actually employed and rendered the service charged.
30. Vargo, supra note 22, at 1572.
31. John Adams, Diary Entry of Monday, July 28, 1766, pp. 19–20, ADAMS FAMILY
PAPERS
AN
ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE,
https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=D13&hi=1&query=fees&tag=text&
archive=all&rec=20&start=10&numRecs=24 (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
32. Patrick Henry’s account book shows that, aside from his receiving his usual
fifteen shillings per case (which was the standard fee for unspecified “other actions”), he
also received in-kind remuneration to get around the per-case fee limitations such as “a
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Concomitant with this, legislation was also enacted to include loserpays rules.33 This continued through the American Revolution, when
many of the colonies adopted “reception statutes” to receive at least
some English common law and acts of Parliament (legislatures
commonly choosing start dates such as 1607, 1620, or 1776) as a legacy
to construct a beginning foundation in their newly created State
authorities.34
Not surprisingly, during the early days of the Republic, lawyers
either challenged, evaded, ignored, or successfully lobbied against the
low fee scale. A widening gap developed between the fees lawyers were
charging their clients, which was steadily climbing, and the amount of
fees that could be taxed as costs, which was stagnant. This was partly
due to inflation and a failure of the State legislatures to update their fee
schedules.35 But, the higher amounts being charged were also becoming
legitimized through case law, notably by breach of contract or quantum
meruit actions.36 By the mid-1800s, many state legislatures, state
courts, or both began to formally unshackle lawyers from the dreaded
fee scales, acknowledging reality and giving way to entrepreneurial
attorneys to charge even higher amounts.37 Eventually, the attorney fee
silver watch,” or “1 Barren Cow,” or “10 Gallons peach brandy.” Clement Eaton, A Mirror
of the Southern Colonial Lawyer: The Fee Books of Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and
Waightstill Avery, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 520, 530–32 (1951). Likewise, Professor Leubsdorf
noted that John Adams “managed to do pretty well, collecting substantial sums by way of
‘gifts’ and charges for legal services not mentioned in the statutory scale.” Leubsdorf,
supra note 28, at 11–12.
33. Professor Leubsdorf notes that the laws in effect at the time “served less as a way
to shift or not shift fees from one party to another than as a way to limit the amount of
those fees.” Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 11.
34. Georgia’s reception statute gives “full force and effect” to the common laws of
England “as they existed on May 14, 1776.” O.C.G.A. § 1-1-10(c)(1) (1982). But, such
reception statutes were not universal. As discussed in a dissent by Justice Souter, not all
States imported English common law “wholesale” due to general hostility towards the
English government in post-colonial America. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 132 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 13–14. Professor Leubsdorf noted that lawyers such
as Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, and Daniel Webster each routinely collected
from their clients much more money than the allowable statutory maximums.
Interestingly, John Marshall, while he was a practicing lawyer in Virginia, did adhere to
his State’s fee scale. Id. at n. 24. See Vargo, supra note 22, at 1573.
36. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 16. Quantum meruit is defined as the “reasonable
value of services.” Quantum Meruit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37. The Field Code of New York, established in 1848, paved the way to repeal New
York’s regulatory scheme of attorney fee regulation. See The Field Code, 1848 N.Y. Laws
ch. 379. It struck down all provisions “establishing or regulating the costs or fees of
attorneys” and expressly stated “hereafter the measure of such compensation shall be left
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.” 1848 N.Y. Laws at 258. Other states
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component of loser-pay rules in many States was decoupled or
dramatically reduced from the costs system.38 At the federal level, in
Arcambel v. Wiseman,39 the United States Supreme Court disallowed
fee-shifting altogether, curtly ruling in a one-page opinion that a
damage award, which had annexed to it a charge of $1,600 for counsel’s
fees, should not be allowed.40 Eventually, this gap, along with a
legislative willingness of most legislatures to let go of the English
Rule,41 led to the creation of the American Rule.42
B. The Rise of the Contingent Fee and the American Rule
More freedom to set fees based on prevailing market conditions gave
rise to another inventive approach, and not inconsistent with the
emergence of the American Rule—the contingent fee. This was a
significant pecuniary enhancement beyond a fixed-fee approach or an
hourly amount.43 The contingent fee allowed a person of any means to
have access to the courts without having to pay fees upfront, this in
exchange for the lawyer acquiring a contingent percentage of the
claim.44 And, although there were complaints and statutory
impediments placed on this kind of fee, it became legitimized, accepted,
and now a standard charge.45 The importance of this cannot be
understated, at least as it concerns class action lawsuits. The Eleventh
Circuit prefers the contingent fee approach, as opposed to a lodestar
approach, in common-fund cases. Noting that this approach was in
operation for over 80 years (from 1885 until 1973) in similar situations,
followed. For a discussion of this, see Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without
Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 37 n. 27
(1989). Regarding early court decisions, see Newnan v. Washington, 8 Tenn. 79, 82 (1827)
(“[I]t cannot be seriously thought that the General Assembly intended the tax fee, which
is directed to be included in the bill of costs in each suit, as the sole reward of professional
exertion.”); Adams v. Stevens & Cagger, 26 Wend. 451 (N.Y. 1841) (attorney may collect
fees through quantum meruit, notwithstanding limits established by the legislature).
38. Professor Leubsdorf indicates that the Field Code in New York allowed for
nominal attorney’s fees to be recovered, but also indicates that the reason or reasons
supplied for fixing a nominal amount has been lost to history. Following implementation
of the Code, nine other states allowed no recovery, while most of the rest of the states only
allowed “minuscule amounts.” Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 18, 20, 22.
39. 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
40. Id. at 306.
41. See The Field Code of New York, supra note 37, at 497.
42. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 16–17.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Id.
45. Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 46 (1884) (allowing a contingent fee contract of
50%).
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the Eleventh Circuit held this approach to be “better reasoned” for
awards derived from a common-fund.46 It therefore comes as no surprise
that the contingent fee has thrived during America’s conversion from
the English Rule to the American Rule. Under the American Rule, “the
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable
attorneys’ fee from the loser.”47 Later, this language was slightly
modified to “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose,
unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”48 Save for the state of
Alaska, which employs a modified English Rule,49 the rule against feeshifting is enforced in every state.50 The American Rule is universal
throughout all the federal circuits, its basic principle being
characterized as “bedrock.”51
Even though the American Rule is universally accepted in the federal
courts, class counsel almost always asks the district court to depart
from this rule in a fee application. To do otherwise would mean that
class counsel would have to look to their client, the named class
representative, for payment of their fees. But, that is a rare to
nonexistent situation. Likewise, contingency fee agreements are not
used because there is no nexus between the contract and the attorney’s
fees to be recovered from absent class members. Arguably, even though
there is privity of contract between attorney and client, such privity
does not extend to class members.52 In other words, the fee agreement
does not bind class members.53
It is therefore one of the exceptions to the American Rule, and not
the Rule itself, that is the driving force to a class counsel’s fee recovery.
At the federal level, these exceptions are:
46. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 774.
47. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
48. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010).
49. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
50. Davis, supra note 24, at 402.
51. Hardt, 560 U.S. at 253.
52. Typically a canon of state law, privity of contract “requires that only parties to a
contract may bring suit to enforce it.” Scott v. Cushman & Wakefield of Georgia, Inc., 249
Ga. App. 264, 265, 537 S.E.2d 794, 796 (2001). Arguably, since an individual class
member is not a party to the original representation agreement, an attorney cannot
enforce provisions of the attorney fee agreement against an absent individual.
53. See Steigerwald v. Saul, No. 1:17-CV-01516, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 905971, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 4, 2020) (holding that a contingent fee agreement between the class
representative and class counsel did not bind class members). The district court concluded
that “Class Counsel does not have a valid contingent fee agreement with the class
members.” See also Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 120 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Private arrangements individual members of the class
may have with counsel are simply irrelevant.”).
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(1) A fee award created through plaintiff’s efforts that establishes a
pool of money or a “common fund” from which class counsel takes
a percentage.54
(2) A fee award expressly authorized by statute.55
(3) A fee award based on contract.56
(4) A fee award based on a nonmonetary benefit, often called a
“substantial benefit,” in which a class of persons are benefitted
through a plaintiff’s efforts.57
(5) A fee award due to a party’s bad faith.58
(6) A fee award based on enforcement of a contempt order.59

Less seen are substantial benefit and contract cases. But, of all the
exceptions, it is the pool of money from the common-fund exception that
is most used by class counsel to obtain attorney’s fees. That is why fees
can result in the millions of dollars in common-fund scenarios.
Comparatively, the fee-shifting exception—which is the English Rule by
another name—often pays less money than the common-fund exception,
unless the hours charged exceed a percentage of the common-fund.
Such a payment scheme has difficulty competing with the common-fund
method.
III. TYPES OF FEE CALCULATIONS: WHICH ONE TO USE?
There are three ways to calculate fees: (1) the percentage-of-the-fund
or common-fund method (terms that will be used interchangeably
throughout this Article),60 (2) the lodestar method,61 and (3) a hybrid

54. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 529 (1882).
55. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257 (“[A]bsent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay
their own attorney’s fees.”).
56. Id.
57. F. D. Rich Co., Inc. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129–
30 (1974) (holding that an exception exists “where a successful litigant has conferred a
substantial benefit on a class of persons and the court’s shifting of fees operates to spread
the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited class.”).
58. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (observing that the underlying rationale is a
punitive action taken by the court).
59. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427–28 (1923) (allowing
fees that were incurred by enforcing a contempt order).
60. The Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit endorse the percentage-of-the-fund
approach and require district courts to follow this method. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946
F.2d at 774 (“Henceforth in this circuit, attorneys’ fees awarded from a common fund shall
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using either the percentage-of-the-fund method or the lodestar method
as a primary determinant, accompanied with a cross-check of the
secondary determinant, to assure reasonableness.62 Examined below in
some detail are the first two methods, as these are those most used in
the Eleventh Circuit. A brief discussion of the hybrid method, only as it
pertains to crosschecking the first two methods, also follows.
A. Percentage-of-the-Fund Method: The Preferred Approach
The leading case in the Eleventh Circuit is Camden I Condo. Ass’n. v.
Dunkle, which requires district courts to use the percentage-of-the-fund
method.63 As an equitable remedy, this method of calculation “rests on

be based upon a reasonable percentage of the fund established for the benefit of the
class”); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[W]e conclude
that percentage-of-the-fund is the proper method for calculating fees in a common fund
case.”).
61. In 1985, the Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees, which
consisted of a number of distinguished judges and scholars, was formed to study and
make recommendations regarding the various methods to determine attorney’s fee
awards. Widely cited, the Task Force’s Report discussed what a lodestar is and how it is
calculated:
First, the court must determine the hours reasonably expended by counsel that
created, protected, or preserved the fund. Second, the number of compensable
hours is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney’s services.
Hourly rates may vary according to the status of the attorney who performed
the work (that is, the attorney’s experience, reputation, practice, qualifications,
and similar factors) or the nature of the services provided. This multiplication
of the number of compensable hours by the reasonable hourly rate was said to
constitute the “lodestar” of the court’s fee determination.
Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1985).
62. The United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits defer to their respective district courts’ informed discretion to use
either for the percentage-of-the-fund or lodestar method or a crosscheck. See In re
Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295,
308 (1st Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to use either method or some
combination); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 821–22 (3d Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to use either method or as a
crosscheck for the other); Linneman v. Vita-Mix Corp., 970 F.3d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2020)
(district court has discretion to select the most appropriate method); Americana Art China
Co., Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc., 743 F.3d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 2014) (district
court may choose either method); Johnston v. Comerica Mort. Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th
Cir. 1996) (district court has discretion to determine which of the two methods to apply);
In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court
has discretion to use either lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund method, but is
encouraged to employ a crosscheck); Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 482–83 (10th Cir.
1994) (“Our approach has been called a ‘hybrid’ approach, combining the percentage fee
method with the specific factors traditionally used to calculate the lodestar.”).
63. Camden I Condo. Ass’n., 946 F.2d at 768.
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the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without
contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s
expense.”64 Stated another way, equity will not allow class members to
gain a “free ride” on the laboring oars of the attorneys.65 The district
court then exercises jurisdiction over this fund and assesses a
percentage of the attorney’s fees over the entire fund by spreading the
fees proportionately among the class members.66
Importantly, at least as it concerns class counsel, Camden I Condo.
Ass’n establishes a “median range” of fees—20% to 30%—with 25% as a
benchmark.67 For the Eleventh Circuit, a 2017 survey reported that a
mean percentage average was 30% while the median average was
33%.68 These percentages can go higher,69 or lower depending on the
individual case.70
B. The Johnson Factors
If class counsel requests fees beyond 25%,71 the Eleventh Circuit
instructs that a laundry list of factors be used for percentage
adjustments called the Johnson factors.72 Such factors were put in place
to establish a record for the appellate court to have a “meaningful

64. Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 478.
65. See Wal-Mart Stores Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that free riding on attorneys’ efforts would be “contrary to the equitable
concept of ‘common fund.’”).
66. Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 478.
67. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 775.
68. Eisenberg, supra note 17 at 951.
69. See Cabot E. Broward 2 LLC v. Cabot, No. 16-61218-CIV, 2018 U.S. LEXIS
192706 at *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2018) (33.333%); Fernandez v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 15-22782-CIV, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 219031, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
18, 2017) (35%); Waters v. Cook’s Pest Control, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00394-LSC, 2012 U.S.
LEXIS 99129, at *16 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 17, 2012) (35%).
70. See Kuhr v. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, No. 3:19-CV-453-MMH-MCR, 2021 U.S.
LEXIS 184994, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2021) (20%); Roth v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.,
No. 16-62942-CIV, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 188204, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2020) (21.56%);
Halpern v. You Fit Health Clubs, LLC, No. 18-61722-CIV, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 143753, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019)(17.62%).
71. Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011).
72. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
Johnson is controlling law in the Eleventh Circuit by virtue of Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions from the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding in the
Eleventh Circuit).
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review” of how the district court made its percentage adjustments.73
Three additional factors were added years later,74 and various district
courts have included other factors that may be unique to that particular
case.75
Johnson listed the following factors be discussed in fee applications
for percentage adjustment purposes: (1) the time and labor required; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the
nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases.76 And, thanks to Camden I Condo.
Ass’n, there are three more: “[(13)] whether there are any substantial
objections by class members or other parties to the settlement terms or
the fees requested by counsel [; (14)] any non-monetary benefits
conferred upon the class by the settlement[;] and [(15)] the economics
involved in prosecuting a class action.”77 In lodestar calculations or
crosschecks to a contingent fee amount, the Supreme Court has
relegated the second, third, eighth, and ninth factors to secondary
importance, these being subsumed within the lodestar amount or basic
fee.78

73. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 720; see Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558 (reversing district court’s
enhancement of lodestar fee awarded on “impressionistic basis” undermined “objective
and reviewable basis” that did not permit “meaningful appellate review.”).
74. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 775.
75. Id. (district courts are also to consider “additional factors unique to the particular
case . . .”); see Ferron v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. 20-CV-62136-RAR, 2021 U.S. LEXIS
81589, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 13, 2021) (“As applied, the Camden I [Condo. Ass’n] factors
and the facts unique to this case support the reasonableness of the requested attorneys’
fees and costs award.”). For the sake of clarity and brevity, all of the factors mentioned
will be referred to as the Johnson factors.
76. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
77. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 775.
78. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
565 (1986), modified, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898–900
(1984)).
Expanding on our earlier finding in Hensley that many of the Johnson factors
‘are subsumed within the initial calculation’ of the lodestar, we specifically
held in Blum that the ‘novelty [and] complexity of the issues,’ ‘the special skill
and experience of counsel,’ the ‘quality of representation,’ and the ‘results
obtained’ from the litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar
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Practical experience dictates that fee applicants should always go
through the Johnson factors and any other factors, notwithstanding
whether the percentage amount sought is lower than 25%, since the
district court has such wide discretion to fix fees. That advice can be
more like a cautious warning, as Professors Macey and Miller have put
it, “the court should award fees and expenses only up to the level
justified by the information presented.”79 Interestingly, there is no
parallel requirement for district courts to explicitly analyze the Johnson
factors in its order awarding attorney’s fees, and the Eleventh Circuit
has declined to make such a rule.80
Care should be taken to prepare and assemble declarations or
affidavits, evidentiary exhibits, and contemporaneous time records
(should they be necessary) to make a complete record. Demonstrating
the amount of time expended, often when analyzed through a lodestar
cross-check,81 is often considered a useful metric to enable the court to
value the services offered in a given case. The Supreme Court has also
weighed-in, indicating that while it is not necessary to record in “great
detail how each minute . . . was expended,”82 evidence should indicate
the “hours worked and rates claimed.”83 But, post-Hensley, other courts
from around the country have put forth several degrees of exactitude
regarding billing records, and no uniform standard is in play.84
Submission of complete time records as part of the fee application
can be thorny. Attorneys often hate recording their time. And, district
courts often loath having to review time records, one describing it as

amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing the basic
fee award.
79. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 198 (2009).
80. In re Home Depot, Inc., 931 F.3d at 1090.
81. Waters, 190 F.3d at 1298 (“[W]hile we have decided in this circuit that a lodestar
calculation is not proper in common fund cases, we may refer to that figure for
comparison.”).
82. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12.
83. Id. at 433.
84. See Feuer v. Cornerstone Hotels Corp., No. 14-CV-5388, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 202316,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2021) (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.
1998)) (“Applications for fee awards should generally be documented by
contemporaneously created time records that specify, for each attorney, the date, the
hours expended, and the nature of the work done”); Cf. Moore v. D.C., 674 F. Supp. 901,
905 (D.D.C. 1987) (“Adequate documentation is required—not bills”); Cf. Ramsey v. State
of Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. CIV.A. 96-T-275-N, 2000 WL 426187, at *5 (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 13, 2000) (15-minute intervals on billing records held insufficient); Cf. San Filippo v.
U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, Inc., No. 81 CIV. 19 (JFK), 1986 WL 3512, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
19, 1986) (five-minute increments on billing records held sufficient).
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“mind numbing.”85 It can be a time-consuming process,86 having been
described as “complex.”87 Hardly anyone likes it.
But, in common-fund cases, the Eleventh Circuit has not indicated
an absolute requirement that raw time records be submitted. This is
because the rationale behind awarding a reasonable percentage in
common-fund cases differs from the rationale of awarding a lodestar in
fee-shifting cases. The Third Circuit Task Force, which studied issues
such as these, concluded that each issue should be handled differently.88
Awarding fees in common-fund cases serves the twin goals of avoiding
unjust enrichment of class members,89 and staying compliant with the
American Rule.90 Hence, Courts are more interested with the quality of
time91 spent by an attorney on a common fund case rather than, say,
the total amount of time spent by an attorney demonstrating his or her
lodestar.92 Submitting time records, therefore, does little to show the
effect class counsel has had on enlarging the recovery for absent class
members in common fund cases.
In contrast, in awarding fees in statutory fee-shifting lodestar cases,
the goal is to provide an incentive for persons, including those with
limited means, to privately enforce certain statutes, even when a
monetary recovery is small.93 Such statutes are purposefully designed—
but woefully inadequate—to attract competent counsel by including feeshifting provisions. Requiring a defendant to pay class counsel his or
her hours at market rate is still, nonetheless, consistent with this
legislative purpose. Submitting time records in a fee-shifting case is
therefore necessary and required.94

85. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1214 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
86. See Stanley v. U.S. Steel Co., No. 04-74654, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 114065, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 8, 2009).
87. Hirsch et al., supra note 4, at 2.
88. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 255.
89. Trustees, 105 U.S. at 528. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 250.
90. Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 481 (“The common-fund doctrine, as applied in this case,
is entirely consistent with the American rule against taxing the losing party with the
victor’s attorney’s fees.”).
91. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 773.
92. Blum, 465 U.S. at 900 n.16.
93. City of Burlington, 505 U.S. at 568 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
94. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.
1988) (“Further, fee counsel should have maintained records to show the time spent on
the different claims, and the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be
set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed
for each activity.”).
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This begs the question: for common-fund cases, are maintaining
contemporaneous time records even necessary? The short answer is,
yes. And it is a very wise practice, too. The raw records may be required
by the district court to show enhancements beyond a 25% contingency
fee.95 That reason may be reason enough. Additionally, to enhance the
persuasion factor, a declaration of one or more class counsel typically
accompanies a fee application and usually provides a summary of the
time spent by counsel. At the least, the raw fee records can serve as a
backup because it is not unusual for district court judges to ask counsel
for additional support.96 Finally, and not unimportantly, should fees be
awarded to multiple attorneys who are grouped as “class counsel,” the
raw records may be helpful to allocate the division of fees.97 These are
all good reasons.
The alternative—if accurate records are not kept—can be perilous:
the court can strike or reduce excessive or redundant records and
accordingly reduce the amount of the fee award sought.98 Even worse,
the district court can call into question the attorney’s credibility and
truthfulness.99 If an attorney did not maintain contemporary time
records, many district courts will accept recreated time records as
evidence of time expended.100 Such a reconstruction, even when faced
with objections of unreliability, has been deemed acceptable.101
Many district court judges have indicated that an estimate or a
sampling of time is acceptable.102 The typical practice is for class
counsel is to submit summaries of time, often categorized, through
declarations or affidavits.103 This is done to show enhancement of the
95. Camden I Condo. Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 775. Adjustments of the percentage amount
rely on the Johnson factors which include the “time and labor required” which must be
shown. Id. at 772.
96. Hirsch et. al., supra note 4, at 103–05.
97. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
(“Ideally, allocation is a private matter to be handled among class counsel.”).
98. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.
99. For example, in Ramsey, after a review of time records, the district court sided
against plaintiffs’ counsel believing that some rounding off to the nearest quarter hour did
occur despite contradictory testimony of one of plaintiff’s counsel, that is, “neither his firm
nor he individually has a policy of rounding off time entries to the nearest quarter hour
and that, ‘typically, . . . I don’t do any rounding at all.’” Ramsey, 2000 WL 426187, at *4–5.
100. Alba Conte, 1 Attorney Fee Awards § 4:26 (3rd ed. 2021).
101. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 772 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Comm’r, I.N.S.
v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 166 (1990).
102. Hirsch et. al., supra note 4, at 103–05.
103. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04-CV-0003-HLM, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152308, at *10 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2010) (declarations used describing attorneys’
activities).
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percentage or to provide the court a useful cross-check. If there is a call
to provide more detail, then class counsel can file the submissions to
satisfy an objection or a court inquiry. Knowing the district court’s
preferences is helpful.
C. Fee-Shifting Cases: A Good Idea that Needs Improvement
Fee-shifting cases start with the lodestar, which the Supreme Court
has said must be used.104 Lodestar cases typically involve hourly fees
that are awarded through statutes or agreements in which the opposing
party—and not the class members—pay “prevailing market rates in the
relevant community.”105 It is the classic English Rule in motion. It is
incumbent on a fee applicant, therefore, to demonstrate the number of
hours worked and multiply this by the applicable prevailing hourly
rates.106
1. Prevailing Party
To be eligible for a fee award, the plaintiff must be a prevailing party
on “any significant claim affording some of the relief sought.”107 The
Supreme Court initially allowed a highly flexible definition for
“prevailing party,” not limiting it just to judgments against a defendant,
but expanding it to monetary settlements,108 or even a “change in
conduct that redresses the plaintiff’s grievances.”109 This became known
as the “catalyst theory.”110
But years later, the breadth of the catalyst theory became
procedurally hampered by virtue of Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources.111
Buckhannon initially caused an uproar in the legal community because
it excluded attorney’s fees to any party who did not receive a judgment
on the merits or obtain a court-ordered consent decree.112 This,
explained the Court, would cause a “material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties” that was necessary to permit such an

104. City of Burlington, 505 U.S. at 562.
105. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
106. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424.
107. Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989).
108. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (“The fact that respondent prevailed
through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.”).
109. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760–61 (1987).
110. Id. at 763.
111. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
112. Id. at 601.
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award.113 But, while the importance of Buckhannon may apply in many
different situations, it is virtually obsolete as it concerns class action
cases. This is because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(e)
requires court approval for settlements, dismissals, or compromises,
effectively thwarting any Buckhannon-style objections.114
2. Time Records and Billing Judgment
For time records, the hours recorded must be “reasonably expended”
and an attorney must exercise “billing judgment,” removing excessive or
redundant hours.115 It can be recorded on a per task basis or even in
“block billing.”116 It can also include reasonable time expended for those
who contributed to the work product, such as paralegals and law clerks
at marketplace rates.117
As for billing judgment, knowing whether or not the task performed
may be tallied as compensable is important. For example, prosecuting
one lawsuit containing unrelated claims with mixed results for success
can be problematic; only the successful claims can be deemed
prevailing. The time put into the unsuccessful claims is not
compensable.118 However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
time expended towards multiple claims with mixed results that “involve
a common core of facts” or are “based on related legal theories” can be
difficult to divide from the litigation as a whole.119 Taking this cue, the
Eleventh Circuit has affirmed district courts’ refusals to reduce a
lodestar among successful and non-successful claims when the case
facts were “inextricably intertwined” in a race discrimination suit,120
and “overlapping and intertwined,” in a First Amendment wrongful
discharge case.121 But, this should not be taken as a panacea on
lawsuits containing multiple claims with mixed success: the Eleventh

113. Id. at 604.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
115. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
116. “Block billing” details tasks into one time entry without a time breakdown for
each task. This has been approved as “reasonable and efficient” and not to be
“discouraged.” Spurlock v. Complete Cash Holdings, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-219-AT, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94598, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2021).
117. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). See Jean, 863 F.2d at 778 (holding
law clerk and paralegal time is recoverable but “only to the extent that the paralegal
performs work traditionally done by an attorney.”).
118. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35.
119. Id. at 435.
120. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008).
121. Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Circuit has taken a case-by-case approach and has also excluded hours
on the non-successful claims. 122
Categories of expended time deemed compensable in fee-shifting
cases include time invested in a matter prior to the lawyer-client
relationship,123 time spent on soliciting and vetting potential class
representatives,124 travel time,125 and time spent on preparing the fee
application.126 Class counsel should therefore exercise billing judgment
here and not go overboard loading up questionable hours. The oftenrepeated proverb “pigs get fed, hogs get slaughtered” can—and does—
happen as similar types of motions get decided.127 An outrageous
request for fees can result in an applicant receiving no fee at all.128
3. Prevailing Market Rates
The other half of the lodestar multiplication is determining what
constitutes a reasonable hourly rate. In the Eleventh Circuit, “[a]
reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant
legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and reputation.”129 The relevant market
is “the place where the case is filed.”130 A fee applicant carries the
burden to demonstrate such market rates and must provide evidence of

122. Avila v. Coca-Cola Co., 849 F.2d 511, 514 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a lodestar
be reexamined because claims were of a “different nature.”). See Shannon v. Bellsouth
Telecomm., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 718 (11th Cir. 2002) (same result in mixed results
concerning discrimination and retaliation claims).
123. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Florida, 698 F.2d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 1983) (civil
rights class action).
124. In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d at 1088 (contractual fee-shifting case).
125. Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Alabama, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983);
holding modified by Gaines v. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 775 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th
Cir. 1985) (reasonable travel time allowed, but rate may be reduced if no legal work was
performed during travel).
126. Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 1985). But, for lodestar cross-check
purposes, time spent preparing a fee application in a common-fund case is not allowed
since that time does not benefit the absent class members. See William B. Rubenstein, 4
Newberg on Class Actions § 14:7 (4th ed. 2021).
127. Park Cityz Realty, LLC v. Archos Capital, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00522-JCB, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175974, at *2 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2021) (court applied this adage to
plaintiffs seeking excessive fees and costs in motion for sanctions).
128. Fair Hous. Council of Greater Washington v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 98 (4th Cir.
1993) (fee request so outrageously excessive it shocked the conscience of the court,
resulting in no fee recovery).
129. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
130. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing Cullens v. Georgia Dep’t. of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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rates “actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.”131 Proof is often
shown through declarations or affidavits, fee award studies, expert
testimony, and even discovery from the opposing party demonstrating
the opposition’s hourly rate.132 In addition, some or all of the relevant
Johnson factors may be used.133 The district court itself also may use its
own experience and expertise to determine what is reasonable.134
4. Multipliers: “A Little Help?”
In Muehler v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc.,135 Judge Miles W. Lord
passionately wrote about attorney’s fees in class actions, stating in part:
The contingent fee and the class action are “the poor man’s keys to
the courthouse.” Both vehicles allow the average citizen and taxpayer
to have their injuries redressed and their rights protected. Both
permit persons of limited resources to obtain competent legal counsel,
an essential ingredient in our adversary system of justice. And both
are under constant attack.136

In fee-shifting cases, a policy to encourage attorneys to prosecute a
bad actor’s violation of a statute is likewise no less compelling to ensure
competent representation. But, the gap between what a common-fund
case pays and what a lodestar pays is widening. Lodestar cases are
simply less desirable to take on and prosecute. And like the precontingent fee era of America’s colonial days, straight lodestar cases
almost always pay less than a comparable common-fund fee case.
Monetary enhancements to compensate lawyers for the risk of
nonrecovery seems almost nonexistent.
The Supreme Court has helped a little bit, but not much. It has said
that reasonable hours times a reasonable rate “does not end the
inquiry” and that “other considerations” may allow for an upward (or
downward) adjustment of fees.137 But, this was later narrowed to mean
that the lodestar figure was still considered to be a “strong
presumption” for reasonableness, and that only a rare circumstance will
trigger an adjustment where the lodestar itself is not reasonable and

131. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299.
132. See generally Conte, supra note 100, at 45–49.
133. Maner v. Linkan LLC, 602 F. App’x 489, 493 (11th Cir. 2015).
134. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that
district court is itself an expert who may draw upon its own knowledge and experience to
determine prevailing market rates).
135. 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1370 (D. Minn. 1985).
136. Id. at 1375.
137. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
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otherwise inadequate.138 Arguably, the Court is still encouraging
attorneys to take on lodestar cases since it did not wipe out
enhancements altogether. 139
In Perdue v. Kenny A., the Court indicated at least three situations in
which an upward or downward adjustment of fees using the lodestar
method is possible: (1) the method for determining the hourly rate
during the lodestar calculation is an inadequate measure of the
attorney’s true market value; (2) there is an extraordinary outlay of
expenses borne by the attorney and litigation is exceptionally
protracted; and (3) extraordinary circumstances result in an exceptional
delay to the payment of fees to the attorney.140 By its near rebuke of the
Johnson factors, as well as other previous decisions, Perdue’s
realignment of how adjustments may be justified seemingly
consolidates or rebrands some of the non-subsumed Johnson factors
into a new package.
The Eleventh Circuit; however, has strayed slightly from these
guidelines, at least to the extent of analyzing lodestar enhancements
through the lens of the Johnson factors. Whether or not this constitutes
a departure from the rare circumstance to move a proposed lodestar
upward or downward remains to be seen. But, in In re Home Depot,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit clarified its standards for lodestar
adjustments by employing use of the Johnson factors to “determine if
the proposed [hourly] rate accurately reflects the true worth of
counsel.”141 This was done despite Perdue’s realignment of the Johnson
factors. Does this mean that for lodestar adjustments, the Eleventh
Circuit still endorses the Johnson factors? Although the Johnson factors
did face intense criticism throughout In re Home Depot, Inc., the
discussion regarding enhancements is not over. But, where the
discussion may lead is anyone’s guess.
In a bit of irony, enhancements to a lodestar are most often discussed
when attorneys attempt to justify the reasonableness of their
percentage-take in common fund, not lodestar, fee applications.
138. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554.
139. For a discussion of the rationale behind enhancement, see 7B Wright, Miller, &
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3rd § 1803.1 (West 2005) (“[S]ince the
objective of the award is to create a financial incentive to initiate socially desirable
litigation and thereby enhance access to the adjudicative process, taking into account the
amount of the benefit actually produced and allowing fees to be enhanced accordingly
seems particularly appropriate.”).
140. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554–56.
141. In re Home Depot, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1091. Ultimately, it was decided that the
district court had abused its discretion to use a multiplier to account for risk. This was not
an appropriate basis for enhancement. Id. at 1084.
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Enhancement of lodestar amounts are usually expressed as
“multipliers.” Typically, class counsel will quantify the amount
requested for the fee—often expressed as a dollar amount of the
monetary fund, the common benefit, or some combination of the two—
and divide it by lodestar amount, which equates to a “multiplier.”142
Percentage-of-the-fund fee applications with lodestar multipliers
averaging three, have been approved as reasonable within the Eleventh
Circuit.143 This is called or known as the “lodestar cross-check” and it is
used as a “check” or a “cross-check” to demonstrate reasonableness in
common fund applications. It is a useful tool in a class action lawyer’s
toolbox, but such a tool is no fix-it in encouraging competent counsel to
prosecute violations of socially desirable statutes.
The bottom line is this: lawyers need to be paid well. Lodestar fee
applications should be enhanced to make them comparable to common
fund cases. This would give a huge boost to statutory fee-shifting cases
and fulfill the legislative imperative to enforce compliance of socially
desirable statutes. Such a reform lies with Congress and not the courts.
5. A Hybrid of Sorts: the Lodestar Cross-Check
The lodestar cross-check, discussed in the previous section, can
effectively demonstrate the reasonableness of a fee award in commonfund cases.144 This tool should be used in all percentage-of-the-fund fee
applications. Establishing a lodestar, therefore, is an important starting
point to demonstrate that the percentage of the common-fund applied
for is reasonable. The end goal for class counsel is to show that the fee
derived from the common-fund calculation is not out of whack when
compared to or “cross-checked” with a lodestar computation.145
Multipliers are then used, also as described in the previous section, to
demonstrate that a common-fund award and a lodestar award (with a
“reasonable” multiplier) are roughly equivalent. The cross-check will
often satisfy district courts that the approved percentage-of-thecommon-fund is reasonable. Such cross-checks are not required in the

142. See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 271 n. 16
(D.N.H. 2007).
143. Behrens v. Wometco Enter., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Behrens v. Wometco Enter., 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.2d at 1091 (“Courts often use a cross-check to ensure
that the fee produced by the chosen method is in the ballpark of an appropriate fee.”).
145. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit,146 but the device it is widely used here and
elsewhere.147
IV. PROBLEMS WITH COMMON-FUND APPLICATIONS
A. Choice of Law Considerations
If the parties can agree on the source of law that governs the
settlement agreement, it should be inserted as one of the settlement
provisions. But, if no agreement can be reached, the parties risk forcing
the case into ponderous choice of law issues—causing the case to travel
into an ionizing nebula sputtering gases of uncertainty and delay. No
party’s attorney or judge wants to go there. The prudent move is to
agree on a choice of law provision.
If there is no agreement for which jurisdiction controls, courts sitting
in diversity usually evaluate choice of law rules under the principles
established by the Erie Doctrine.148 Where a federal question is at
stake, federal law rules. This becomes more problematic in multidistrict litigation (MDL) situations.
Although it may be counterintuitive to some, the power of a federal
court to award attorney’s fees in a class action case is not derived from
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(h) itself.149 Nor is it derived
from a district court’s inherent federal equitable powers of awarding
fees due to the unjust enrichment of class members.150 Instead, State
law, rather than federal common law, normally applies because contract
interpretation of a settlement agreement is a matter of state contract
law.151 But as a practical matter, the parties often agree to adopt the
federal law of the jurisdiction where the case sits as the controlling
jurisdiction.

146. In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1280 n. 26.
147. For example, an examination of 431 PSLRA class action settlements from 2007
through 2012 indicated that 92.16% of all fee applications employed a cross-check
analysis. See Lynn A. Baker, et al., Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting
in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1387 n. 73 (2015).
148. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
149. Wright, et al., supra note 139. See In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension
Litig., 692 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We reject the argument that Rule 23(h) provides a
basis for applying federal-law principles to the award of attorneys’ fees here.”).
150. In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d at 16.
151. In re Chira, 567 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009).
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B. Clear-Sailing Provisions
A clear-sailing provision is a stipulation that the amount of the
negotiated attorney’s fees will not be contested by the defense side, so
long as it falls at or beneath a negotiated cap.152 It is a provision that is
only occasionally inserted into agreements. Including such a provision
into a settlement agreement gives something to both parties.153
Plaintiffs get some assurances that their payday will not be delayed or
bogged down in a protracted district court fight or otherwise held
hostage to a prolonged appeal. And defendants get the certainty of
knowing the amount of their total payout.154
Although the parties may like such agreements, these provisions are
often perceived as red flags to objectors, district courts, and even some
commentators.155 The criticisms leveled are largely twofold, that (1)
class counsel conducted simultaneous negotiations of settlement relief
and attorney’s fees—said to trigger concerns of ethical violations—to
the detriment of the absent class members;156 and (2) that class counsel
may be more accepting of a smaller class award in exchange for
preferred treatment of their attorney’s fees.157 These criticisms have
raised concerns that the adversarial approach for fees is taken out of
play, excepting objections by a class member or that the district court
sua sponte has its own concerns. Additionally, doubts or suspicions are
raised that class counsel secured its own path to fee procurement by
bargaining away something of value that otherwise would have gone to
the absent class members. These criticisms taken separately or together
can be devastating.

152. In re Home Depot, Inc., 931 F.3d at 1081.
153. Id. at 1081 n. 14.
154. Id. at 1081.
155. Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action
Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 901 (2016).
156. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that to
avoid potential conflicts of interest and ethical improprieties, conducting a negotiation of
fees must begin after a settlement on the merits was concluded). This became known as
the Prandini Rule, and it has been widely followed on a broad scale by various federal
courts. The Supreme Court soon after limited the Prandini Rule, finding that such a rule
hampered settlements in civil rights fee-shifting cases and reversed Prandini. Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737–38 (1986) (holding “it is not necessary to construe the Fees Act
[42 U.S.C. § 1988] as embodying a general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the
waiver of fees in order to be faithful to the purposes of that Act.”). Nevertheless, the
shadow of the Prandini Rule lives on for common-fund cases.
157. See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 907 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
concurring). Judge Newman’s concurrence discussing these criticisms has been widely
cited.
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The FRCP enable district courts to carefully scrutinize
settlements.158 A district court can spoil an approval of a fee application
or the class settlement, or both, by using a heightened scrutiny to
analyze the reasonableness of the fees.159 Ironically, the very act of a
district court using a heightened scrutiny analysis could defeat the
original purpose of inserting the clear-sailing provision into the
settlement agreement in the first place, that is, by prolonging the
approval process or jeopardizing the agreed upon amounts in the
settlement.
There are only a few cases in the Eleventh Circuit that discuss clearsailing agreements. That could be due to the nature of the agreements
themselves limiting appellate action. But of the objections lodged that
actually reached the appellate level, the judicial panels routinely
rejected such complaints, often finding that the record supported no
such allegations of collusion.160 But, despite this lack of any reportable
judicial temper tantrums towards clear-sailing arrangements, the risks
of a clear-sailing agreement spoiling a settlement remain the same. The
bottom line is that in all common-fund settlements, where the defense’s
only real interest is in a total settlement payout, defendants ought to
stay in their own lane for matters regarding fee issues. Those are issues
between the class counsel and the district court—not the defendants.161
C. “Kicker” Clauses
A kicker clause is an agreement “that provides that if the judge
reduces the amount of fees that the proposed settlement awards to class
counsel, the savings shall inure not to the class but to the defendant.”162
Judge Posner has called this clause a “gimmick for defeating objectors,”
as it deprives an objector proper standing to object.163 This, he
explained, is because the class receives no benefit from the reduction,
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing district court’s consideration regarding
the terms for any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including the time of payment).
159. Redman, 768 F.3d at 637 (reversing district court’s approval of settlement
agreement, noting that clear-sailing clause should have been subjected to “intense critical
scrutiny,” which it was not at the district court level).
160. See Carter v. Forjas Taurus, S.A., 701 F. App’x 759, 766 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding
no collusion); Waters, 190 F.3d at 1293 n.4 (adopting district court finding of no collusion
amid complaints surrounding clear-sailing agreement).
161. In re Chira, 567 F.3d at 1311.
162. Pearson, 772 F.3d at 786. See Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 F. App’x. 624, 630 n. 6
(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 949
(9th Cir. 2011) (“A ‘kicker’ clause provides that ‘all fees not awarded would revert to
defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund or otherwise benefit the class.’”)).
163. Pearson, 772 F.3d at 786.
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and likewise, the objecting class member has no stake in the outcome of
the dispute—depriving standing.164
Unsurprisingly, it is not unusual to see in a settlement agreement a
clear-sailing provision accompanied with a kicker clause,165 which is a
strategic one-two punch. Depending on how the settlement agreement
is structured, it could theoretically freeze or confine an objector’s
complaint about attorney’s fees, which on its face, is a red flag showing
collusion in some quarters. That said, appellate courts are beginning to
take action to insure against such collusion between class counsel and
the defense regarding these clauses.166 Although this issue has not yet
come to light in the Eleventh Circuit, counsel should be aware of the
issues regarding a kicker clause and the implications of using it with a
clear-sailing arrangement. If such clauses are used in tandem, as seems
to be the trend, three words come to mind: proceed with caution.
V. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
A. Standards of Review
Once a fee application is submitted, the ultimate decision in
awarding fees rests within the sound discretion of the district court.167
This has been characterized as “wide,”168 since the district court is in
the “best position to calculate such an award.”169 But, that discretion is
not unlimited,170 and the district court must articulate a “concise but
clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.”171
That decision may be appealed by any party or an objector after a
final disposition of the merits as a final appealable decision.172 An
appellate court would thereafter determine whether the district court
abused its discretion in its Order on Attorney’s Fees. In other words, as
164. Id.
165. See In re Samsung Top-Load Washing Mach. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab.
Litig., 997 F.3d at 1088.
166. Id. at 1091 (employing a “heightened scrutiny approach” where the two clauses
are included in a settlement agreement); Cf. In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litig., 799
F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (calling for “intense critical scrutiny” for such a combination
of clauses).
167. Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017).
168. Id. at 1163.
169. Id.
170. Id. (“Unquestionably, the district court possesses wide discretion in calculating
the amount and reasonableness of such an award”); See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558 (district
court’s discretion not unlimited).
171. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See Conte, supra note 100, at § 2:29.
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it was opined in Gray v. Bostic173 in an en banc concurring opinion, “if a
district court has abused its discretion, the court of appeals should not
decide how to exercise the district court’s discretion . . . .”174 The abuse
of discretion standard in the Eleventh Circuit is met if the district court
failed to apply the proper legal standard, if proper procedures were not
followed in making the fee determination, or if the fee determination is
based on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.175
B. Procedures
The procedures are referenced in FRCP 23(h).176 A claim for an
award must be made pursuant to FRCP 54(d)(2).177 The timing to file
the application should be made before the expiration of allowable
objections so that objectors have notice and a sufficient opportunity to
be heard.178 Since proof is required to demonstrate reasonableness,
affidavits, declarations, time records (or a synopsis), and evidence must
be submitted. Typically, the application accompanies the motion to
approve the settlement. Although not required, the district often hears
each matter together in the same proceeding and usually decides both
in one written ruling.179 Thereafter, the district court must find facts
and state its conclusions of law as provided in FRCP 52(a).180 Only then
can an appellate court give this ruling a meaningful review.
VI. CONCLUSION
A central theme of this article is to provide an honest assessment of
the law profession with respect to the pursuit of attorney’s fees, and in
particular, class action fees. Notwithstanding the risks involved in
prosecuting a big class action case (and the risk of not winning is
substantial), the attraction of getting huge fees can be powerful and
173. 625 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 2010).
174. Id. at 693 (Carnes, J., concurring) (concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
175. In re Home Depot, Inc., 931 F.3d at 1078.
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2).
178. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that
district court abused its discretion under FRCP 23(h) by requiring class members to object
to fee petition prior to the time fee petition was filed).
179. Although the district court is required to hold a hearing to determine whether a
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to FRCP 23(e)(2), often called a
“fairness hearing,” it is not required to hold a hearing on fees. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(3)
(The court may hold a hearing [on attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs]). As a matter of
convenience, courts often rule on the fee application at the time it rules on the settlement
or shortly thereafter. Conte, supra note 100, at § 2:21, at 200–01.
180. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(3).
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compelling. The hopes of winning “the big case” can be overwhelming
and a day or two may not go by when the potential for that big fee is
detached from the sub-conscience. But that is only human. Like anyone,
lawyers seek a happy life and being financially secure is but one major
component.
Financial security is not the only component to a happy life. The
primary components are simple: work hard, maintain hope, be fair,
show kindness, and strive for high morals. This goes for everyone,
attorneys too, and almost all the ones that I know adhere to these
principles.
But, we attorneys are often labeled as greedy, dishonest, and
unethical. Dickens’ vivid description of lawyer Uriah Heep again comes
to mind, with his “lank forefinger” leaving “clammy tracks” on the page
“like a snail.”181 And separately, the class action device is often branded
as a disreputable way for that greedy lawyer to take millions off the
backs of hardworking, decent-minded, and similarly situated
individuals who are the victims of a bad actor’s enterprise. But this is
unfair branding. I wholeheartedly agree with Judge Lord, cited
previously in this Article, who said:
We as members of the judiciary must be ever watchful to avoid being
isolated from the experience of those who are actively engaged in the
practice of law. It is difficult to evaluate the effort it takes to
successfully and ethically prosecute a large plaintiffs’ class action
suit. It is an experience in which few of us have participated. The
dimensions of the undertaking are awesome. The time and effort
expended test the ability of many lawyers to survive during the
lifetime of the action. Some plaintiffs’ lawyers have worked on cases
before me for as long as ten years and spent a substantial portion of
their billable time each year on the effort. At the end they may have
received a fee in the millions of dollars. However, averaged out over
the years and subtracting taxes and the expenses of a law office, it
averages out to a very moderate payment. It certainly does not
equate with any bonanza or pot of gold.182

Judge Lord concluded about his personal experience: “My personal
experience is that the plaintiffs’ class action bar is responsible, ethical,
and a credit to the legal profession.”183 This is true.
I have practiced with brilliant Ivy League lawyers who receive a
fraction of their true value simply because they are working on salary

181. Dickens, supra note 2.
182. Muehler, 617 F. Supp. at 1376.
183. Id. at 1378.
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for nonprofit organizations. They chose to do this. I have practiced with
large-firm attorneys who are smart, kind, and more concerned about
doing the right thing rather than earning a buck. And, I have practiced
with a variety of individual attorneys, who are wise and wonderful, all
of whom carry deep convictions of a just case result. These are good
people and their motivations are marked by strong moral rectitude.
Attorneys today are as inventive in finding ways to garner fees as
they were over 200 years ago. But, that is no reason to tar and feather
the profession. For the few bad apples out there, and there are some,
there are many checkpoints and safety valves to ensure that the fee
application process is a fair process. The process of determining
whether or not a fee is reasonable is far from perfect. But it does work.

